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Abstract
The euro area as a whole has experienced a marked downward trend in inflation over the past
decades and, concomitantly, a protracted period of depressed activity. Can permanent and grad-
ual shifts in monetary policy be held responsible for these dynamics? To answer this question, we
embed serially correlated changes in the inflation target into a DSGE model with real and nominal
frictions. The formal Bayesian estimation of the model suggests that gradual changes in the infla-
tion target have played a major role in the euro area business cycle. Following an inflation target
shock, the real interest rate increases sharply and persistently, leading to a protracted decline in
economic activity. Counter–factual exercises show that, had monetary policy implemented its new
inflation objective at a faster rate, the euro zone would have experienced more sustained growth
than it actually did.
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Introduction
Inflation in the euro area fell dramatically from 12% in the early 1980’s to 4% in the early 1990’s.
In spite of some differences, inflation rates in most member countries display a significant and very
gradual downward trend over this period. These dynamics have followed purposeful monetary policies
aimed at stabilizing inflation to lower levels (e.g., Germany in the early eighties, or the competitive
disinflation in France and in Italy, in the mid eighties). At the very same time, these economies
experienced protracted periods of recessions. Of course, the dynamics of macroeconomic variables
might be due to other factors or shocks than monetary policy. However, a legitimate question is to
assess whether permanent and gradual changes in monetary policy have significantly affected these
dynamics over the past decades. If so, through which channels did these shocks propagate? This is
the main question adressed in this paper.
As a matter of fact, in the main Continental European countries, disinflation policies have been
implemented very gradually.1 This might reflect either a purposeful choice of monetary policy or
constraints imposed by European Monetary System (EMS) membership. The purposeful choice of
monetary policy is clearly illustrated in Bundesbank (1995), which states that2
“ In view of the unfavorable underlying situation, the Bundesbank felt obliged until 1984
to include an "unavoidable" rate of price rises in its calculations. By so doing, it took
due account of the fact that price increases which have already entered into the decisions
of economic agents cannot be eliminated immediately, but only step by step. (...) The
Bundesbank thereby made it plain that, by adopting an unduly "gradualist" approach to
fighting inflation, it did not whish to contribute to strenghtening inflation expectations.”
Deutsche Bundesbank (1995), pp. 80-81.
Similarly, constraints on monetary policy imposed by EMS membership necessarily prevented the
adoption of a shock therapy to fight inflation, due to exchange rate obligations.3 This is typically the
case for France and Italy, where a competitive disinflation policy was adopted (see De Grauwe, 1990,
and Blanchard and Muet, 1993). Additionally, EMS countries had to maintain this policy for a long
time in order to gain an anti–inflation reputation. This is clearly the position defended by French
Minister Beregovoy, who consistently refused to devaluate
1As pointed out by Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Primiceri (2006), gradual disinflation was explicitly preferred by
the Fed during the seventies, to prevent large sacrifice ratios.
2See Laubach and Posen (1997) for a thorough analysis of German monetary policy.
3This is in contrast to what UK did over the same period.
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“When it comes to France, its monetary policy is well known. It rests on the Franc–
Deutsche Mark parity and the pursuit of the disinflation policy.”
Masset–Denèvre (2000), pp. 168.
To investigate quantitatively the dynamic effects of gradual disinflation, we summarize monetary
policies in the euro area by permanent and gradual changes in the time–varying inflation target of
a fictitious single European Central Bank. This inflation target is further embedded in a Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model, imposing the Friedmanite premise that low frequency
movements in inflation, if any, are necessarily due to this feature of monetary policy.4
As in the bulk of the literature, assuming a single central bank for euro zone countries is meant as a
useful practical simplification of a much more complex decision making process (see, e.g., Smets and
Wouters, 2003). This approach could be problematic when it comes to disinflation shocks. Indeed,
it might be argued legitimately that European countries part of the EMS have faced heterogeneous
disinflation experiences. However, based on the analysis conducted by Ball (1994) and Andersen
and Wascher (1999), we find that disinflation episodes occurred approximately at the same dates in
Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy.5
The main model features are the following. First and foremost, as in Ireland (2007), we assume that
the inflation target follows a non–stationary process. In contrast with Ireland, though, we assume that
changes in the inflation target are exogenous and serially correlated. Second, the DSGE model allows
for various real and nominal frictions, such as habits in consumption, sticky prices, and sticky wages.6
In the case of euro area data, gradual inflation target shocks and wage stickiness can be potentially
crucial. Indeed, as argued by Blanchard (2003), two suspects for the protracted period of depressed
economic activity in Europe over the eighties are: (i) excessive and persistent real wages and (ii)
persistently high real interest rates. Allowing for sticky wages helps us quantify the importance of
the first suspect. Considering gradual inflation target shocks can also help rationalize the observed
inertial dynamics of the short–term nominal interest rate which remained above inflation for a very
long period in the eighties and nineties.
In disentangling the respective roles of each suspect and the channels through which they contributed
to propagate inflation target shocks, a formal econometric procedure is required. In this paper, the
4A number of recent papers have adopted time–varying inflation targets in DSGE models. See, among others,
Adolfson et al. (2005, 2007), Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2008), Cogley and Sbordone (2007), Erceg and Levin
(2003), Ireland (2007), Melecky et al. (2008), Smets and Wouters (2005), and de Walque et al. (2006).
5Throughout the paper, we endorse the working hypothesis that monetary policies are perfectly understood and
credible, as in Ireland (2007). See Erceg and Levin (2003) for an alternative approach emphasizing credibility issues.
Here, we stick to the specification adopted by Ireland to emphasize a single mechanism.
6Our setup also incorporates material goods and a production function à la Kimball (1995).
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DSGE model is taken to the data by adopting a full system Bayesian estimation procedure. Using
marginal likelihoods and posterior odds provides appropriate inputs for models comparison. This
will prove particularly useful when assessing the importance of our assumption of gradual permanent
inflation target shocks.
We find that inflation target shocks significantly contributed to aggregate fluctuations in the euro
area. This result crucially depends on our assumption of gradual diffusion for these shocks. Ignoring
this feature, these shocks are no longer essential in explaining fluctuations of real variables. At the
same time, our hypothesis is strongly supported by the data. Indeed, a version of our model without
gradual inflation target shocks has a much lower marginal likelihood than our benchmark model.
Inspecting the impulse response functions, we also find that the real wage actually declines after
an inflation target shock while the real interest rate persistently increases. This suggests that the
main suspect accounting for the recessionary effects of disinflation shocks is the inertial behavior of
monetary policy, in the form of both gradual disinflation shocks and an inertial interest rate rule.
These results are confirmed by a series of counterfactual exercises conducted with our estimated DSGE
model. We find that, absent inflation target shocks, output would have been higher over the eighties
than it actually was. This is a direct consequence of the high and persistent increase in the real
interest rate triggered by negative inflation target shocks that would have otherwise been avoided. In
addition, we perturb the parameters governing inertia and gradualism in monetary policy. We find
that both stories have played a central role in propagating these shocks. These two features turn out
to imply very long lasting increases in the real interest rate, translating into persistent output losses.
Had monetary policy implemented its new inflation objective at a faster rate, the euro zone would
have experienced more sustained growth than it actually did during the eighties.
The paper is organized as follows. A first section briefly expounds our theoretical model. Section 2 lays
out our econometric procedure and comments on the estimation results. Counterfactual experiments
are conducted in section 3. The last section offers concluding remarks.
1 The DSGE Model
We consider a discrete time economy, populated with a continuum of infinitely–lived households.
Households are endowed with specific skills that are combined together in an aggregate labor index
by an employment agency, as in Erceg et al. (2000). Perfectly competitive firms produce an aggregate
good that can be either consumed or used as a production input. The aggregate good is produced by
combining imperfectly substitutable intermediate goods, each of which is produced by monopolistic
firms which combine aggregate labor and material goods according to a Leontief production function.
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These firms face random nominal price reoptimization opportunities, according to the Calvo (1983)
specification. Symmetrically, households reoptimize their nominal wage at random intervals.
In what follows, we briefly describe the log-linearized version of the model.7 Since the inflation
target changes permanently, all nominal variables are deflated by this variable. In addition, there are
permanent productivity shocks. Thus to induce stationarity, real trending variables are divided by
the productivity shock. All the resulting stationary variables are denoted, below, with the superscipt
"s".
The consumption equations:
(1− βb)(1− b)λˆst = βbEt{yˆ
s
t+1 − byˆ
s
t } − (yˆ
s
t − byˆ
s
t−1) + b[βEt{∆zt+1} −∆zt] + g˜t, (1)
λˆst = Rˆ
s
t + Et{λˆ
s
t+1 −∆zt+1 − πˆ
s
t+1 −∆πˆ
⋆
t+1}, (2)
The detrended marginal utility of wealth λˆst is a weighted average of present, past, and expected
future detrended output (yˆst ). It also depends on expected and present productivity growth ∆zt and
on a preference shock g˜t.8 In turn, λˆst is linked to the ex-ante real interest rate Rˆ
s
t −Et{πˆ
s
t+1+∆πˆ
⋆
t+1}
and expected productivity growth. Here, Rˆst represents the nominal interest rate in deviation from
the inflation target πˆ⋆t (Rˆ
s
t ≡ Rˆt − πˆ
⋆
t ). Similarly, πˆ
s
t denotes the inflation gap (πˆ
s
t ≡ πˆt − πˆ
⋆
t ). The
consumption equation incorporates a preference shock, which is assumed to obey the process
g˜t = ρgg˜t−1 + σgǫg,t, ǫg,t ∼ N(0, 1), ρg ∈ [0, 1). (3)
In turn, productivity growth evolves according to
∆zt = (1− ρz) log(γ) + ρz∆zt−1 + σzǫz,t, ǫz,t ∼ N(0, 1), ρz ∈ [0, 1). (4)
The parameter b ≡ b¯/γ, where b¯ captures the degree of internal habit formation in consumption and
γ is the average gross growth rate of technical progress. Finally β is the subjective discount factor.
The price equation:
πˆst − γpπˆ
s
t−1 = κp(1− µpsx)wˆ
s
t + βEt{πˆ
s
t+1 − γpπˆ
s
t }+ γpζt + µ˜p,t. (5)
The inflation gap πˆst depends on its past and expected future values and on the current logdeviation
of the detrended real wage wˆst . The residual variable ζt obeys the relation ζt ≡ βEt{∆πˆ
⋆
t+1} −∆πˆ
⋆
t .
Finally, the price equation includes a price–markup shock, which is assumed to obey the process
µ˜p,t = ρpµ˜p,t−1 + σpǫp,t, ǫp,t ∼ N(0, 1), ρp ∈ [0, 1). (6)
7See appendix ?? for a complete exposition of the model’s details.
8Here and the remainder of the paper, a variable with a hat refers either to a percentage deviation from steady state
or to the natural logarithm of a gross rate. With a slight abuse of notation, we also use hats to denote logarithms of
non stationary variables.
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The parameter γp is the degree of indexation of prices to past inflation, µp is the steady–state markup,
and sx is the share of material goods in gross output. The composite parameter κp is defined according
to
κp ≡
(1− βαp)(1− αp)
αp(1 + ǫµθp)
,
The parameter αp is the probability that prices cannot be reset in a given period, θp is the price
elasticity of demand, and ǫµ is the steady–state markup elasticity (e.g., Kimball, 1995).
The wage inflation equation:
πˆsw,t − γwπˆ
s
t−1 = κw(ωµ˜
−1
p yˆ
s
t − λˆ
s
t − wˆ
s
t ) + βEt{πˆ
s
w,t+1 − γwπˆ
s
t }+ γwζt + µ˜w,t, (7)
where πˆsw,t, the nominal wage inflation in deviation from the inflation target (πˆ
s
w,t ≡ πˆw,t − πˆ
⋆
t ), is a
function of its expected future value, past and present inflation gaps, and the wage gap (ωµ˜−1p yˆ
s
t −
λˆst − wˆ
s
t ). It also depends on a wage–markup shock µ˜w,t, which is assumed to obey
µ˜w,t = ρwµ˜w,t−1 + σwǫw,t, ǫw,t ∼ N(0, 1), ρw ∈ [0, 1). (8)
Here the parameter γw is the degree of indexation of nominal wages to lagged inflation. The composite
parameters κw and µ˜p are given by
κw ≡
(1− βαw)(1− αw)
(1 + ωθw)αw
, µ˜p ≡
µp(1− sx)
1− µpsx
.
The parameter αw is the probability that nominal wages cannot be reset in a given period, while ω and
θw denote the inverse elasticity of labor supply and the labor demand elasticity, respectively. Finally,
inflation and wage inflation are linked together according to the identity πˆsw,t = πˆ
s
t + wˆ
s
t − wˆ
s
t−1+∆zt.
The monetary policy reaction function:
Rˆ⋆t = πˆ
⋆
t + ap(πˆt − πˆ
⋆
t ) + ayγˆy,t. (9)
Rˆt = ρRˆt−1 + (1− ρ)Rˆ
⋆
t + aπ⋆∆π
⋆
t + ηR,t. (10)
The central bank is assumed to set its nominal interest rate Rˆt according to a generalized Taylor rule.
The target nominal interest rate Rˆ⋆t is a function of the inflation target πˆ
⋆
t , the inflation gap, and the
growth rate of output γˆy,t ≡ yˆst − yˆ
s
t−1 +∆zt. Here, ap is the coefficient coding the responsiveness of
the target rate to the inflation gap and ay is the responsiveness to output growth, as in Coenen et al.
(2008), Edge et al. (2007), and Laforte (2007). The target nominal interest rate Rˆ⋆t is embedded in a
partial adjustment model with autocorrelated shocks. Here, ρ is the degree of interest rate smoothing.
In addition, we allow the nominal interest rate Rˆt to react to changes in the inflation target, with
sensitivity parameter aπ⋆ . This allows us to separate the consequences of monetary policy inertia
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from those of gradual disinflation. To see this most clearly, let us recast the above monetary policy
rule in terms of the stationary variables. We obtain
Rˆst = ρRˆ
s
t−1 + (1− ρ)[apπˆ
s
t + ayγˆy,t] + (aπ⋆ − ρ)∆πˆ
⋆
t + ηR,t, (11)
This illustrates to what extent the coefficient aπ⋆ allows us to neutralize the effect of monetary policy
inertia on the propagation of inflation target shocks. In the case when aπ⋆ = ρ, the nominal interest
rate reacts one for one to changes in the inflation target. To the contrary, suppose that aπ⋆ = 0 and
that ρ is close to one. In this case, the nominal interest rate is disconnected from π⋆t on impact. This
specification is sufficiently flexible to let the data sort out which of these competing configurations
has the better fit.9
In turn, the inflation target shock evolves according to
∆πˆ⋆t = ρπ⋆∆πˆ
⋆
t−1 + σπ⋆ǫπ⋆,t ǫπ⋆,t ∼ N(0, 1), ρπ⋆ ∈ [0, 1). (12)
Thus, in an attempt to capture possible gradual shifts in the inflation target, we assume that changes
in the inflation target are serially correlated. The autocorrelation coefficient ρπ⋆ reflects the slow
pace at which monetary authorities allegedly adjusted its inflation target. This is the key difference
between our specification and previous works that allowed for a time–varying inflation target. Either
the latter is assumed to be stationary (in which case, it is undistinguishable from a standard monetary
policy shock), or it is assumed to follow a pure random walk, as in Ireland (2007), for example.10
Finally, we allow for a standard monetary policy shock ηR,t, which is assumed to evolve according to
ηR,t = ρRηR,t−1 + σRǫR,t, ǫR,t ∼ N(0, 1), ρR ∈ [0, 1). (13)
We are a priori agnostic as to which feature of monetary policy (or combination thereof) accounts for
its observed inertia. We leave it to the data to settle this question.
2 Empirical Results
In this section, our formal econometric procedure is expounded. We then discuss our results and
detail various analyses designed to understand the transmission mechanisms of permanent inflation
target shocks.
9We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting us this flexible specification of the monetary policy rule.
10Notice that our inflation target shock is exogenous, which precludes the study of what has been called the “op-
portunistic approach” to disinflation policy. Following Ireland (2007), this opportunistic approach could have been
modelled by allowing the inflation target shock to covary with supply shocks. In our framework, as in Ireland (2007),
this approach raises an econometric problem. See Cochrane (2007).
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2.1 Data and Econometric Approach
The data used in our empirical analysis are extracted from the AWM database compiled by Fagan et al.
(2005). These are area–wide data for the euro zone as a whole and cover the period 1970(1)–2004(4).
The raw series used are the logarithm of per capita GDP, yˆt, the growth rate of the Harmonized Index
of Consumer Prices, πˆt, the growth rate of nominal wages, πˆw,t, and the real ex–post interest rate
(i.e. the difference between the short–term nominal interest rate and inflation), Rˆt − πˆt.11 The data
are reported in figure ??. The shaded area corresponds to the large recession period that European
countries experienced during the eighties. Over the same period, notice that inflation and wage
inflation sharply declined. At the same time, the real (ex–post) interest rate dramatically increased
in a protracted fashion. Our main goal is now to investigate whether inflation target shocks can be
held responsible for these dynamic patterns. To answer this question, a formal econometric approach
is required.
Let XT ≡ {xt}Tt=0 denote the sample of observable (demeaned) data, where
xt = (∆yˆt,∆πˆt,∆πˆw,t, Rˆt − πˆt)
′.
Notice that the specification of observable data in Xt is compatible with the structural model. Con-
ditional on a given model specification Mi, the prior distribution for the vector of model’s parameters
θ is p(θ|Mi) and the likelihood function associated to the observable variables is L(XT |θ,Mi). Then,
from Bayes theorem, the posterior distribution of θ is given by
p(θ|XT ,Mi) ∝ L(XT |θ,Mi)p(θ|Mi).
This posterior distribution is evaluated numerically using the Metropolis–Hastings algorithm with
300,000 draws. The first 25% draws are discarded to eliminate dependence on the initializing values
chosen for θ.
For the sake of comparing different model versions, we resort to the following two standard criteria.
First, from p(θ|XT ,Mi), one can compute the marginal likelihood of specification Mi, which is defined
by
L(XT |Mi) =
∫
L(XT |θ,Mi)p(θ|Mi)dθ.
A benefit of resorting to this measure of fit is that it accounts for the effects of the prior distribution
(An and Schorfheide, 2007). Second, given a prior probability pi on a given model specification Mi,
the posterior odds ratio is defined as
Pi,T =
piL(XT |Mi)∑M−1
j=0 pjL(XT |Mj)
with
M−1∑
j=0
pj = 1,
11The population series used to express output in per capita terms is the working age population from various issues
of OECD’s Economic Perspective.
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where M is the number of model specifications considered.
2.2 Estimation Results
In the benchmark model version, labelled M0, the vector of estimated parameters is
θ = (b, ω, γp, γw, αp, αw, ρ, ap, ay, aπ⋆ , ρz, ρp, ρw, ρg, ρR, ρπ⋆ , σz, σp, σw, σg, σR, σπ⋆)
′.
We also consider two other model versions. In M1, we set ρπ⋆ = 0. Hence, in this model version,
we assume that the inflation target follows a simple random walk, as in Ireland and Smets and
Wouters. This allows us to assess the consequence of shutting down this channel of monetary policy
inertia. Notice that this assumption affects only the propagation of inflation target shocks. In M2,
we set ρ = 0. Thus nominal interest rate smoothing is ignored. This assumption impacts on the
transmission of all the shocks included in the analysis. In both alternative model versions, all the
remaining parameters are re-estimated. The choice of parameters priors is summarized in the left
panel of table ??.
For the benchmark specification, the estimation results, together with the priors, are graphically
summarized in figure ??.12 In each case, the dark grey line is the posterior distribution while the
light grey line corresponds to the prior distribution. Also, the vertical dashed line denotes the posterior
mode. The results are also reported in the right panels of table ??. For each model version, the table
shows the posterior mean and the 95% HPD interval.
The mean habit parameter is b = 0.82. This value is higher than in Smets and Wouters (2003). This
should come as no surprise given that we estimate a smaller model in which no formal distinction
is established between output and consumption.13 Concerning the utility parameter ω, we obtain a
mean value of 2.10. Inspecting figure ?? reveals that the prior and posterior distributions are almost
identical. This syndrom of a lack of identification is familiar in the literature (Smets and Wouters,
2003).
The wage indexation parameter is γw = 0.37, higher than γp = 0.16. Interestingly, the euro area data
do not require too high a degree of price indexation. This result is now standard in the literature
(Smets and Wouters, 2003, 2005, Rabanal and Rubio–Ramìrez, 2007). We obtain αp = 0.82, which
is fairly high, especially when one acknowledges that our model incorporates many features devised
to lower the estimated value of this parameter (material goods, variable elasticity of demand). The
probability of no wage change is αw = 0.77.
12Details concerning the calibration and the prior distributions of the model parameters are provided in appendix
??.
13Woodford (2003) discusses circumstances in which habit persistence in a small model like ours is compatible with
an interpretation of yt as private expenditures instead of consumption expenditures.
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When it comes to the monetary policy rule, we obtain almost the same results as Smets and Wouters
(2003) for ρ, ap, and ay. The new parameter aπ⋆ = 0.60 suggests that the nominal interest reacts
on impact to changes in the inflation target. However, the estimated value of aπ⋆ is lower than ρ,
meaning that changes in the inflation target are not fully incorporated in the nominal interest rate
on impact.
The marginal likelihoods show that the benchmark model version M0 is clearly favored by the data.
This suggests that a scenario with both gradual changes in the inflation target and nominal interest
rate inertia is preferred to each of the two alternative, in which one form of inertia has been shut down.
The posterior odds ratios offer a complementary way of seeing this. Starting from a prior distribution
on model versions with pj = 1/3 for j = 0, 1, 2, one arrives at the following: P0 = 99.32%, P1 = 0.38%,
and P2 = 0.00%. Therefore, the prior distributions on model versions M1 and M2 are severely shifted
towards model M0, which represents almost the whole probability mass.
2.3 Implications of Inflation Target Shocks
In this subsection, we use the estimated model to analyze the dynamic effects of an inflation target
shock. To do so, we inspect the impulse response functions (IRFs) triggered by this particular shock.
We also compute the contribution of inflation target shocks to aggregate fluctuations.
Before proceeding, it is interesting to compare actual inflation dynamics with the time profile of
the unobserved inflation target that our estimation procedure reveals. As is customary, the latter is
obtained using the full sample information contained in the smoothed inflation target shocks. Figure
?? reports in plain line the actual sample path of the cumulated demeaned first difference of inflation;
the dotted line corresponds to the smoothed estimate of the inflation target. The grey area highlights
the disinflation period experienced by the euro area in the eighties. As the figure makes clear, the
inflation target tracks all the medium to low frequency movements of inflation. Interestingly, however,
it does not fully capture the inflation peaks experienced over the seventies. Arguably, adverse supply
shocks are to be held responsible for these peaks. In contrast, the inflation target mimicks well the
sharp decline in inflation experienced in the early eighties.
Figure ?? reports the dynamic responses of aggregate variables after a one standard error percent,
negative inflation target shock. For each variable, the figure includes the HPD intervals at different
levels (95%, light gray, and 68%, dark gray). Also, the thick line is the mean impulse response function
(IRF) while the dotted line is the median response.14
Annualized inflation displays a regular and slow decline to its new long–run value. The average long–
run response is approximately equal to minus 1.6 percentage point. Notice that it takes more than 20
14All these IRFs are computed by drawing 5,000 values of the vector of model parameters in the posterior distribution.
10
quarters to approximately reach the new steady–state value. At the same time, the nominal interest
rate is only mildly responsive on impact and then gradually declines. This implies a significant rise
in the real interest rate in the immediate aftermath of the inflation target shock. In addition, the
overall dynamics of the nominal interest rate appear significantly slower than for inflation. As a
consequence, the rise in the real (ex–ante) interest rate turns out to be persistent. In turn, this
implies a delayed, inverted–hump–shaped output response. Output reaches its lowest response after
about height quarters. Finally, after twenty quarters, output reverts back to its initial response,
suggesting a very long–lasting effect of the inflation target shock. To confirm this, it is instructive
to inspect the sacrifice ratio implied by this shock, which we compute as the cumulated response of
output divided by the annualized change in inflation. The traditional interpretation of this statistic is
that it represents the total output loss consecutive to a purposeful disinflation. After twenty quarters,
the sacrifice ratio is slightly higher than 4.62 with a 95% HPD interval delimited by 1.39 and 6.71.
This is thus illustrative of the large effects of a negative inflation target shock on output.
In the short–run, wage inflation displays a similar pattern as that of inflation but since our estimates
suggest greater price stickiness than nominal wage stickiness, the real wage decreases in a protracted
fashion. The lowest response is reached after about 13 quarters. The real wage dynamics turn out to
be even more persistent than that of output. This result is interesting because it suggests that the
disinflation period in the euro area was not associated with excessively high real wages. Instead, our
estimated model highlights the importance of real interest rate dynamics. This calls for a thorough
assessment of the role of monetary policy in the depressed growth period experienced by the euro
area in the eighties, to which we return in the next section.
To conclude this section, we assess the contribution of the inflation target shock to aggregate fluctua-
tions. Table ?? reports the forecast error variance decomposition at different horizons. This exercise
is conducted in all three estimated model versions discussed above.
In the benchmark specification, M0, the fluctuations of nominal variables (inflation, wage inflation
and the nominal interest rate) are essentially explained by the inflation target shock, even in the
short–run. For example, it accounts for 64% of inflation, 38% of wage inflation and 50% of the
nominal interest rate after four quarters. At longer horizons, this shock explains by construction all
the fluctuations in the nominal variables. Though the DSGE model implies long–run neutrality of
monetary policy shocks, the inflation target shock has sizeable effects on real variables. For example,
it account approximatively for 17% of the variance of output after twelve quarters. Additionally, it
represents 13% of the variance of the real interest rate after twelve quarters. This contribution is
smaller for the real wage.
These findings contrast with what obtains in model M1 (ρπ⋆ = 0). Indeed, in this case, the inflation
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target shock explains only a trivial portion of output dynamics. This is due to the fact that at
medium to long horizons, this shock has a smaller contribution to fluctuations in the real interest
rate when compared to the benchmark case. This result emphasizes the key role of gradual inflation
target shocks. Notice that our results in M1 are very similar to what Ireland (2007) obtains on US
data. Recall that in his specification, the inflation target follows a simple random walk. While this
might be a defendible hypothesis for the US case, our empirical results suggest that it is less tenable
for euro area data. Finally, in model M2 (ρ = 0), we obtain an even smaller contribution of inflation
target shocks to all real variables. This indicates that the shape of monetary policy itself has played
a significant role in the propagation of inflation target shocks.
3 Counterfactual Analysis on Monetary Policy
The preceeding section has highlighted the crucial role of gradual monetary policy in shaping the euro
area business cycle. Armed with these empirical results, we now turn our attention to a counterfactual
analysis of gradual monetary policy. All these quantitative experiments are conducted using our
benchmark model specification M0.
3.1 What Happens When There Are No Inflation Target Shocks?
In order to assess the role played by the inflation target shock, we compute counterfactual sample
pathes for inflation, output, real wage, the nominal interest rate, and the real (ex–ante) interest
rate implied by the model, as in Ireland (2007). These samples are obtained using the following
straightforward procedure. We first assume that no inflation target shocks whatsoever occured and
feed the benchmark model with the remaining five smoothed shocks. The resulting sample pathes are
reported in figure ??. The solid line corresponds to the benchmark case. Because we simulate the
model with smoothed shocks, these simulated data correspond to actual data. The dotted line is the
counterfactual path, with inflation target shocks set to zero in each and every period. Finally, the
figure also reports a shaded area corresponding to the disinflation period experienced by euro area
countries.
In this counterfactual experiment, the long–run and non–stationary component of inflation is elimi-
nated. As a consequence, the large downswing in inflation that occured in the 1980’s is absent from
the simulated path. Notice that, in spite of this, inflation continues to exhibit a substantial amount
of low frequency movements, reflecting the high degree of nominal rigidities found in the estimated
model. Another interesting feature is the time profile of the stochastic growth component of output
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(i.e. that portion of output dynamics not explained by the deterministic part of exogenous produc-
tivity). During the seventies, shuting the inflation target shock down does not alter the dynamics of
output significantly. On the contrary, during the eighties (shaded area), the euro zone would have
experienced more sustained growth than it actually did, had it not been hit by negative inflation
target shocks. The traditional explanations for the protracted period of depressed growth in the euro
area consecutive to disinflation policies are (i) too high a real wage (due to nominal wage rigidities)
and (ii) too high a real interest rate. Given that our model attributes a large part of the decline
in output to negative inflation target shocks, it is interesting to study what would have been the
dynamics of the real wage and the real interest rate absent these shocks. As was to be expected from
the previous section, we find that the real wage is hardly affected by the omission of the inflation
target shock. Real wages would have been slightly higher in the mid eighties had it not been for
the disinflation shocks. Our main finding in this exercise is that the dynamics of the real (ex–ante)
interest rate is much more affected by omitting the inflation target shocks. Indeed, the real interest
rate would have fallen in the early eighties and remained below its actual path during the eighties if
inflation target shocks had not hit the economy.
3.2 Consequences of Alternative Monetary Policies
The previous exercise suggests a non trivial role of monetary policy in our sample. To investigate
further this issue, we use our estimated version of the DSGE model to perform counterfactual analyses
focused only on the shape of monetary policy. These exercises are meant to shed additional light on
the main mechanisms at work after a permanent change in the inflation target. In each experiment,
the estimated model is used as our benchmark. We modify the two key parameters ρπ⋆ and ρ
capturing the observed persistence in monetary policy. At the same time, we keep aπ⋆ unchanged
(recall that this parameter allows us to separate the consequences of gradual changes in the inflation
target from nominal interest rate inertia). These counterfactual experiments about monetary policy
are investigated by inspecting how the dynamic responses of inflation, output, the real wage, the
nominal interest rate, and the real (ex–ante) interest rate differ from the benchmark responses. All
the results are reported in figure ??.
Immediate Diffusion of Inflation Target Shocks. We first investigate whether the persistence
in the inflation target has played a sizeable role in the depressive effect of disinflation policies. The
idea is to assess whether a faster adjustment of the inflation target to its new value could have altered
the dynamic responses of aggregate variables in the Euro zone. This quantitative analysis echoes
previous debates about the optimal speed of disinflation (see Taylor, 1983, and Sargent, 1983). It is
worth noting that empirical studies suggest that a higher disinflation speed often results in a lower
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output loss (see Ball, 1994, and Boschen and Weise, 2001). To investigate this, we set ρπ⋆ = 0 in our
first experiment.
As shown in figure ??, inflation drops very quickly to its new long–run value (in approximately 3
periods). At the same time, the response of the real wage and output are smaller than what obtained
in the benchmark case. The decline in output follows from the response of the real interest rate.
To understand this, notice that, after eliminating inessential terms, equations (??) and (??) can be
combined together to yield the forward solution
yˆst = byˆ
s
t−1 −
(1− βb)(1− b)
βb
Et


∞∑
j=0
rˆt+j

 , (14)
where rˆt ≡ Rˆt − Et{πˆt+1} is the real ex–ante interest rate. As in Boivin and Giannoni (2006), we
interpret the term in curly brackets as the long–term real interest rate, the latter being simply the
infinite cumulated sum of ex–ante real short–term rates. Thus, output negatively responds to this
long–term real rate. As a consequence, if monetary policy induces persistent increases in the real
interest rate, the negative output response will be more pronounced and more persistent.
In order to understand the dynamics of the real (ex ante) interest rate, it is important to inspect the
dynamics of the nominal interest rate and expected inflation. Recall that in this first experiment, the
remaining monetary policy parameters are left unchanged. In the ρπ⋆ = 0 scenario, expected inflation
almost instantly jumps to its new steady–state value. Given our specification of monetary policy, this
is not completely refelcted in the nominal interest rate insofar as aπ⋆ < ρ. As a conserquence, the
real interest rate increases on impact. Given the estimated degree of interest rate smoothing, this
increase turns out to be persistent, though less pronounced than in the benchmark. Thus, output
indeed falls. Notice that, given the forward–looking nature of equation (??), what appears to be a
small difference in the dynamics of the real interest rate (when one compares the benchamrk model
with the ρπ⋆ = 0 case), turns out to imply fairly large differences in output dynamics.
To see this even more clearly, let us consider the following counterfactual exercise, reported in figure
??. Here, we compare the outcome of three alternative model versions. The first one is the benchmark
model with gradual changes in the inflation target. The second is the same model but with inflation
target shocks set to zero in each and every period, as in the previous subsection. The last one is
similar to the benchmark, except that gradualism is shut down, i.e. we assume ρπ⋆ = 0. To make
this illustration even more striking, we focus only on the eighties. As is clear, output has noticeably
different dynamics when ρπ⋆ = 0 and in the benchmark. This suggests that gradual disinflation has
ended up in large output losses in the eighties. This obtains for very small differences in the real
interest rate. Even more interesting, the figure shows that the eurozone would have experienced
almost identical output dynamics with an immediate disinflation (ρπ⋆ = 0) or without any negative
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changes in the inflation target (π⋆t = 0). This finding is in sharp contrast with what would obtain in an
old fashioned Keynesian model (Okun, 1978, Gordon and King, 1982). In such a setup, the relative
gradualism of economic policy does not matter, since private expectations are backward–looking.
Thus, whether or not disinflation is gradual is relatively irrelevant in old Keynesian models.
No Nominal Interest Rate Inertia. In a second experiment, we consider the adjustment speed
of the nominal interest rate. Monetary policy inertia is somewhat akin to the gradual diffusion of
inflation target shocks in terms of adjustment speed of nominal variables. However, it acts differently
in that a higher nominal interest rate inertia can disconnect the nominal rate from inflation in the
short–run . For example, if the nominal interest rate is almost unresponsive in the short–run whereas
the inflation target reaches its new (lower) long–run value, one should expect a persistent increase in
the real interest rate translating into a sizeable output loss. Thus, in this second experiment, we set
ρ = 0.
We see from figure ??, that this new form of monetary policy has strong implications on the dynamic
responses of output and the real interest rate. At the same time, the response of inflation is almost
unaffected in comparison to the benchmark case and the real wage is almost unresponsive. These
results suggest that the speed of adjustment to the targeted nominal interest rate governs a large part
of the model’s dynamics. Here, since monetary policy displays no inertia, the nominal interest rate
follows closely the inflation rate. As a consequence, the real interest rate is almost unresponsive and
thus the output loss consecutive to a disinflation shock is very small. This finding suggests that the
form of monetary policy, namely monetary policy inertia, has played an important role in the large
and persistent increase of the real interest rate and the sizeable output loss that have followed from
disinflation policies in the eighties.
No Diffusion – No Inertia. The last experiment mixes the previous two, i.e. an immediate
adjustment of the inflation target combined with no monetary policy inertia (ρ = ρπ⋆ = 0). In this
situation, inflation adjusts very quickly to its new long–run value and the disinflation shock has almost
no effect on output. Once again, this obtains because the real interest rate is almost unresponsive to
this shock.
This exercise is a further illustration of the familiar “disinflation without recession” phenomenon. Re-
call that despite some form of backward–lookingness in the private sector behavior (habit persistence,
indexation), the model remains forward–looking. When the inflation target is expected to adjusts
immediately to its new steady–state level and the nominal interest is allowed to respond one for
one to changes in the inflation target, the real interest rate has a flat dynamic path. Thus, output
does not react to the target shock. Once again, this is in contrast with what can happen in an
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old–fashioned Keynesian model. In such a setup, even when gradualism and inertia are shut down, a
disinflation shock entails a large sacrifice ratio (though smaller that what obtains with both inertia
and gradualism).
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have attempted to quantify the importance of gradual inflation target shocks in
the euro zone business cycle. To do so, we formulated a DSGE model with various real and nominal
frictions. Our main results are that these shocks are important insofar as changes in the inflation
target are gradual. This hypothesis is strongly supported by the data, based on marginal likelihood
rankings. In addition, our framework enables us to disentangle the respective roles of excessive and
persistent real wages and real interest rates in explaining the protracted period of depressed economic
activity in the euro area over the eighties. Our findings suggest that real wages played a minor role
while real interest rates seem to be the essential part of the story. Running several counterfactual
experiments, we find that monetary policy itself, due to gradualism and inertia, is responsible for the
observed dynamics of the real interest rate.
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Table 1. Structural parameter estimates, 1970(1)–2004(4)
Prior distribution Posterior distribution
M0 M1 M2
Type Mean S.E. 5% Mean 95% 5% Mean 95% 5% Mean 95%
b beta 0.7000 0.0500 0.7726 0.8240 0.8730 0.7995 0.8455 0.8958 0.8770 0.9005 0.9272
ω normal 2.0000 0.5000 1.2982 2.0948 2.8951 1.3455 2.0897 2.9095 1.7924 2.5527 3.2596
γp beta 0.5000 0.1500 0.0573 0.1620 0.2607 0.0640 0.1898 0.3186 0.1158 0.1772 0.2372
γw beta 0.5000 0.1500 0.1718 0.3727 0.5690 0.1989 0.3951 0.6009 0.7058 0.8114 0.9293
αp beta 0.7500 0.0500 0.7588 0.8179 0.8855 0.7353 0.8037 0.8714 0.6823 0.7178 0.7510
αw beta 0.7500 0.0500 0.6954 0.7740 0.8423 0.6674 0.7508 0.8280 0.6363 0.7021 0.7650
ρ beta 0.7500 0.1000 0.8663 0.8971 0.9281 0.8264 0.8644 0.9126 — — —
ap normal 1.7000 0.1500 1.3393 1.5889 1.8320 1.3044 1.5450 1.8049 1.3047 1.5270 1.3047
ay normal 0.1250 0.0500 0.0799 0.1591 0.2414 0.0913 0.1737 0.2539 0.0072 0.0455 0.0072
aπ⋆ normal 0.7500 0.2500 0.3856 0.6015 0.8023 -0.2152 0.3608 0.8341 -0.2152 0.3608 0.8341
ρz beta 0.2500 0.0500 0.1656 0.2407 0.3142 0.1649 0.2384 0.3165 0.1536 0.2314 0.3016
ρp beta 0.7500 0.1500 0.0878 0.2262 0.3599 0.0987 0.2905 0.4637 0.1345 0.2781 0.4218
ρw beta 0.7500 0.1500 0.7388 0.8184 0.9057 0.7737 0.8452 0.9238 0.7342 0.8143 0.8976
ρg beta 0.7500 0.1500 0.1892 0.4215 0.6309 0.3479 0.5552 0.7419 0.1851 0.3203 0.4590
ρR beta 0.7500 0.1500 0.1920 0.3153 0.4328 0.2621 0.4314 0.5718 0.9562 0.9657 0.9757
ρπ⋆ beta 0.7500 0.1500 0.5858 0.7392 0.9064 — — — 0.6376 0.7611 0.8912
σz inv. gamma 0.2500 2.0000 0.4543 0.5298 0.6033 0.4438 0.5229 0.6018 0.4970 0.5718 0.6392
σp inv. gamma 0.2500 2.0000 0.1650 0.2011 0.2365 0.1382 0.1921 0.2522 0.0346 0.0429 0.0516
σw inv. gamma 0.2500 2.0000 0.0515 0.0848 0.1159 0.0518 0.0828 0.1141 0.0503 0.0828 0.1158
σg inv. gamma 0.2500 2.0000 0.2102 0.2967 0.3856 0.2110 0.2881 0.3630 0.3188 0.3812 0.4483
σR inv. gamma 0.2500 2.0000 0.1087 0.1258 0.1437 0.1063 0.1303 0.1534 0.4155 0.5072 0.5940
σπ⋆ inv. gamma 0.2500 2.0000 0.0643 0.0916 0.1196 0.0764 0.1351 0.1869 0.0563 0.0820 0.1065
Marginal likelihood -246.8950 -252.4741 -305.7210
Posterior odds ratio 0.9962 0.0038 0.0000
Notes: The posterior distribution is obtained using the Metropolis–Hastings algorithm. Model codes: M0: benchmark model; M1: ρπ⋆ = 0; M2: ρ = 0. The posterior
odd ratios are obtained under a uniform prior on model versions.
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Table 2. Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Forecast Horizon
1 4 8 12 20 40
Model M0
Output 7.78 14.61 17.77 17.23 13.76 8.34
Inflation 10.18 63.72 85.85 91.79 95.64 98.01
Wage Inflation 8.41 38.34 66.69 78.74 87.56 93.79
Nominal Interest Rate 21.06 50.27 72.91 83.05 91.03 96.18
Real Interest Rate 0.58 5.39 10.59 13.24 14.77 14.83
Real Wage 0.17 0.48 0.96 1.48 2.40 3.21
Model M1
Output 0.41 0.73 0.99 1.01 0.82 0.49
Inflation 12.70 37.68 53.67 62.55 72.91 84.16
Wage Inflation 7.28 17.55 28.30 36.99 48.56 64.17
Nominal Interest Rate 19.87 19.36 28.50 37.94 52.38 71.12
Real Interest Rate 1.66 3.82 4.01 4.06 4.04 3.96
Real Wage 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.16 0.20
Model M2
Output 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.04
Inflation 2.20 10.74 20.09 26.12 33.61 45.84
Wage Inflation 0.67 4.58 11.43 17.11 25.46 39.72
Nominal Interest Rate 21.40 35.21 45.01 49.24 53.40 61.57
Real Interest Rate 0.68 0.42 0.29 0.24 0.21 0.20
Real Wage 1.09 1.29 0.86 0.58 0.32 0.15
Notes: Model codes: M0: benchmark model; M1: ρπ⋆ = 0; M2: ρ = 0.
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Figure 1: Data Used in Estimation
Notes: The shaded area indicates the large recession period experienced by Euro area countries in the
1980’s.
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Figure 2: Parameter Prior and Posterior Distribution
Notes: The vertical line denotes the posterior mode, the light grey line is the prior distribution, and
the black line is the posterior distribution.
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Figure 3: Annualized Inflation and Inflation Target
Notes: The series are demeaned. Actual inflation: solid line; inflation target: dotted line. The shaded
area indicates the large recession period experienced by Euro area countries in the 1980’s.
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Figure 4: Impulse Response Functions to an Inflation Target Shock
Notes: Impulse response to a one standard error % shock. The light gray and dark gray areas correspond
to the 95% and 68% HPD intervals, respectively. The thick line and the dotted line correspond to the
mean and median IRFs, respectively.
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Figure 5: Counterfactual Analysis, πˆ⋆t = 0
Notes: The series are demeaned. Actual variable: solid line; counterfactual variable: dotted line. The
shaded area indicates the large recession period experienced by Euro area countries in the 1980’s.
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Figure 6: Counterfactual IRFs
Notes: In each case, the shock is normalized so as to generate the same long–run effect on inflation.
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Figure 7: Counterfactual Pathes
Notes: The plain line is the benchmark path, the dashed line corresponds to the no–disinflation case,
and the line with stars corresponds to the shock–therapy case (ρπ⋆ = 0).
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A Model’s Details
A.1 Households and Wage Setting
The typical household υ seeks to maximize
Et
∞∑
T=t
βT {egT log(cT − b¯cT−1)− V (hT (υ)},
where β ∈ [0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, b¯ ∈ [0, 1) is the degree of habit formation in
consumption, ct is consumption, hT (υ) is the supply of labor of type υ, and V (hT (υ)) is the associated
disutility. Finally, gt is a consumption–preference shock, the dynamics of which will be specified later.
The household faces the sequence of constraints
PT cT +BT+1/RT = WT (υ)hT (υ) + ProfT +BT ,
where Pt is the aggregate price level, Bt+1 is the quantity of nominal government bonds acquired at
t, maturing at t+ 1, and paying the gross nominal interest rate Rt. Wt(υ) is the nominal wage paid
to labor of type υ. Finally Proft denotes profits redistributed by monopolistic firms.
Each household supplies labor to a competitive employment agency which combines the differentiated
labor inputs {ht(υ), υ ∈ [0, 1]} into an aggregate labor index ht according to
ht =
(∫ 1
0
ht(υ)
(θw,t−1)/θw,tdυ
)θw,t/(θw,t−1)
,
where θw,t > 1 is the stochastically varying elasticity of substitution between any two labor types, the
dynamics of which will be specified later. Associated with this technology is the demand for labor of
type υ, which obeys
ht(υ) =
(
Wt(υ)
Wt
)
−θw,t
ht,
where the aggregate wage index Wt is defined by
Wt =
(∫ 1
0
Wt(υ)
1−θw,t
)1/(1−θw,t)
.
It is assumed that at each point in time, a typical household can reoptimize its wage with probability
1−αw, irrespective of the elapsed time since it last revised its age. The remaining households simply
revise their wage according to the rule
Wt(υ) = γ(π
⋆
t )
1−γw(πt−1)
γwWt−1(υ),
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where γ is the steady–state gross growth rate of technical progress, γw ∈ [0, 1] is the degree of
indexation to the most recently available inflation measure, π⋆t is the gross inflation target (to be
defined later), and πt is gross inflation.
Let us now turn our attention to the wage setting decision and define h⋆t,T (υ) the supply of hours at
T by household υ if it last reoptimized its wage at t. In period t, if drawn to reoptimize, household
υ chooses his wage rate W ⋆t (υ) so as to solve
max
W ⋆t (υ)
Et
∞∑
T=t
(βαw)
T−t
{
λT
γT−tδwt,TW
⋆
t (υ)
PT
− V (h⋆t,T (υ))
}
,
subject to
h⋆t,T (υ) =
(
γT−tδwt,T
πwt,T
w⋆t (υ)
wt
)
−θw,t
ht,
where w⋆t (υ) ≡W
⋆
t (υ)/Pt, π
w
t,T ≡WT /Wt, and the factor δ
w
t,T obeys
δwt,T =


∏T−1
j=t (π
⋆
j+1)
1−γw(πj)
γw if T > t
1 otherwise
,
For later reference, it is convenient to define the “wage markup”
µw,t ≡
θw,t
θw,t − 1
.
A.2 Production Side and Price Setting
There is a unique aggregate good, dt, which can be either consumed, yt, or used as an input in
production, xt. Thus, dt = yt + xt. The aggregate good is produced by competitive firms according
to the Kimball (1995) type technology
∫ 1
0
G
(
dt(ς)
dt
; eϕt
)
dς = 1,
where ϕt is a price–elasticity shock, the dynamics of which will be specified later, G(·; eϕt) is increasing
and strictly concave, is such that G12(1; 1) = 0, and satisfies the normalization G(1, eϕt) = 1, and
dt(ς) is the input of intermediate good ς, with ς ∈ [0, 1]. Here and in the remainder, Gi is the partial
derivative of G with respect to its ith argument and Gij is the cross partial derivative of G with
respect to arguments i and j. Similarly, (Gi)−1 will denote the reciprocal of Gi, taken as a function
of its first argument. The Kimball (1995) type technology is a theoretical device that allows for a
small slope of the Phillips curve without assuming too high a degree of nominal price rigiditiy (see,
e.g., Woodford, 2003).
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The associated demand function for good ς is
dt(ς) = dt(G1)
−1
(
Pt(ς)
Pt
Υt; e
ϕt
)
, where Υt ≡
∫ 1
0
dt(ς)
dt
G1
(
dt(ς)
dt
; eϕt
)
dς.
Pt(ς) is the nominal price of good ς and Pt is the aggregate price level, which is implicitly defined by
the relation∫ 1
0
Pt(ς)dt(ς)
Ptdt
dς = 1.
Associated with the above technology is θp(et(ς), eϕt) the elasticity of demand for a given intermediate
good whose relative demand is equal to et(ς). Formally
θp(et(ς), e
ϕt) = −
G1(et(ς); e
ϕt)
et(ς)G11(et(ς); eϕt)
.
From this, we can also define the price markup µp(et(ς); eϕt) through the familiar expression
µp(et(ς); e
ϕt) =
θp(et(ς); e
ϕt)
θp(et(ς); eϕt)− 1
.
For later reference, it is also convenient to define µp ≡ µp(1; 1) the steady–state markup as well as
µˆp,t ≡
D2µp(1; 1)
µp
ϕt
where D2µp(1; 1)/µp is the steady–state elasticity of µp with respect to eϕt , and where a hat denotes
logdeviation from steady state.
Each intermediate good ς ∈ [0, 1] is produced by a monopolistic firm with the same index. Firm ς
has technology
dt(ς) = min
{
eztnt(ς)− κe
zt
1− sx
,
xt(ς)
sx
}
,
where nt(ς) and xt(ς) are the inputs of aggregate labor and material goods, respectively, and zt is a
permanent productivity shock. Here, κezt is a fixed production cost which grows at the same rate
as technical progress. This assumption ensures the existence of a well–defined balanced growth path.
The fixed cost will be pinned down so that aggregate profits are zero in the deterministic steady state.
The real marginal cost associated with the above technology is
st = (1− sx)wte
−zt + sx,
where wt ≡Wt/Pt is the real wage rate paid to aggregate labor.
We assume that in each period of time, a monopolistic firm can reoptimize its price with probability
1−αp, irrespective of the elapsed time since it last revised its price. If the firm cannot reoptimize its
price, the latter is rescaled according to the simple revision rule
Pt(ς) = (π
⋆
t )
1−γp(πt−1)
γpPt−1(ς)
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where γp ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of indexation to the most recently available inflation measure.
Let d⋆t,T (ς) denote the production of firm ς at T if it last revised its price in period t. Then, if drawn
to reoptimize at t, firm ς sets its new price P ⋆t (ς) so as to solve
max
P ⋆t (ς)
Et
∞∑
T=t
(βαp)
T−tλT
λt
{
δpt,TP
⋆
t (ς)
Pt
d⋆t,T (ς)− sTd
⋆
t,T (ς),
}
,
subject to
d⋆t,T (ς) = dT (G1)
−1
(
δpt,TP
⋆
t (ς)
Pt
ΥT ; e
ϕT
)
,
where
δpt,T =


∏T−1
j=t (π
⋆
j+1)
1−γp(πj)
γp if T > t
1 otherwise
.
A.3 Technicalities
Before loglinearizing the equilibrium conditions implied by the above model, we must appropriately
get rid of the stochastic trends included in our specification. To do so, all real trending variables are
divided by ezt , while πt, πw,t ≡Wt/Wt−1, and Rt are divided by π⋆t . At this stage, it is convenient to
define
πsw,t ≡ πw,t/π
⋆
t , π
s
t ≡ πt/π
⋆
t , R
s
t ≡ Rt/π
⋆
t .
Similarly, we define
yst ≡ yt/e
zt , wst ≡ wt/e
zt , λst ≡ λe
zt .
The stochastic shocks g˜t, µ˜p,t, and µ˜w,t are defined in terms of the structural shocks gt, ϕt and θw,t
according to the formulas
g˜t = (1− b)[gt − βbEt{gt+1}], µ˜p,t = κpµˆp,t, µ˜w,t = κwµˆw,t.
B Prior Distributions
B.1 Calibration
We partition the model parameters into two groups. Let θc ≡ (β, sx, γ, θp, θw, ǫµ)′ denote the vector
of calibrated parameters. We set β = 0.99. The growth rate of technical progress is set to the mean
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gross growth rate of output, γ = 1.0045. We impose sx = 0.5, which matches the euro area figure
reported by Jellema et al. (2006). We chose to calibrate θp, θw and ǫµ because these parameters
cannot be separately identified as long as we want to estimate the probabilities of price and wage
fixity, namely αp and αw. Note that αw and θw appear only in the definition of κw. The data allow us
only to estimate the partial elasticity of wage inflation with respect to the labor disutility wedge, and
many combinations of αw and θw are compatible with a given estimate of this partial elasticity (see
Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997, and Amato and Laubach, 2003). We encountered similar difficulties
when trying to estimate αp, ǫµ, and θp. Since we estimate αp and αw, the other parameters are
calibrated prior to estimation. As in Rabanal and Rubio–Ramírez (2007), we set θp = 6 and θw = 11.
Finally, we set ǫµ = 1. As argued by Chari et al. (2000), it is important that this value be set to
generate a reasonable curvature of the demand function faced by a monopolist. With the chosen
value, we obtain that a 2% increase in relative prices results in a 14.8% decline in demand, similar to
the 11.2% decline in demand that obtains under ǫµ = 0.
B.2 Choice of Prior Distributions
In the benchmark version, the priors for the utility parameters are based on the belief that it takes
a high degree of habit formation and a low elasticity of labor supply to match the data (see, e.g.,
Smets and Wouters, 2003, Rabanal and Rubio–Ramírez, 2007). At the same time, previous results
in the literature suggest that ω is difficult to estimate precisely. Thus, we must combine our prior
belief that ω is high with the fact that relatively little is known on this parameter at the aggregate
level. Accordingly, we adopt a normal distribution for ω, with a prior mean set to 2 and a standard
error set to 0.5. While still informative, this prior distribution is dispersed enough to allow for a wide
range of possible and realistic values to be considered. For the habit parameter, we adopt a Beta
prior, ensuring that this parameter belongs to [0, 1]. The prior mean is set to 0.7, with a standard
error of 0.05.
We adopt Beta prior distributions for αp, αw, γp, and γw. For the Calvo probabilities, our priors are
based on the thorough studies conducted by the ECB’s Inflation Persistence Network , as summarized
by Dhyne et al. (2006), and Wage Dynamics Network , as summarized by Druant et al. (2008). We
thus set both prior means to 0.75 with a low standard error of 0.05. We adopt less strict priors for
the indexation parameters, with prior means set to 0.5 and standard errors set to 0.15.
We adopt analog priors as those used by Smets and Wouters (2003) for the monetary policy param-
eters, namely ap, ay and ρ. More precisely, ap and ay are assumed to be normally distributed, with
means 1.7 and 0.125, respectively and associated standard errors of 0.15 and 0.05, respectively. For
the degree of nominal interest rate smoothing, ρ, we adopt a Beta distribution, with mean set to 0.75
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and standard error set to 0.1. The new parameter aπ⋆ has a normal distribution centered on 0.75, as
for ρ, but with a larger standard error, set to 0.25.
All the standard errors of shocks are assumed to be distributed according to inverted Gamma distribu-
tions, with prior means 0.25 and standard error 0.25. The autoregressive parameters are all assumed
to follow Beta distributions. Except for technology shocks, all these distributions are centered on
0.75. For technology shocks, a much lower mean of 0.25 is adopted. This reflects our prior belief that
TFP growth is only mildly serially correlated, if ever. We assume a common standard error of 0.15,
slightly larger than that assumed by Smets and Wouters (2003). We allow for a lower standard error
for the prior distribution of ρz.
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